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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-3537 
___________ 
 
MRS. BARBARA JEAN FELDMAN;  
MR. LEE FELDMAN, 
     Appellants 
 
v. 
 
H.A. BERKHEIMER, INC., d/b/a Berkheimer Tax Administrator;  
JORDAN TAX SERVICE, INC.; DORMONT BOROUGH, INC.;  
KEYSTONE OAKS SCHOOL DISTRICT; GOEHRING, RUTTER & BOEHM 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:13-cv-01711) 
District Judge:  Honorable Nora Barry Fischer 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 1, 2015 
 
Before:  FUENTES, SHWARTZ and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 24, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 The Feldmans, husband and wife, filed suit in the District Court against a tax 
preparer and others, raising a litany of claims related to their argument that Mrs. Feldman 
is entitled to a refund for the amount of tax withheld ($147) from her 401(k) 
contributions for the 2012 tax year.  On the defendants’ motions, the District Court 
dismissed their complaint for failure to state a claim and disallowed amendment.  They 
appeal.   
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the order dismissing 
the complaint is plenary.1  McGovern v. City of Phila., 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009). 
Upon review, we agree with the District Court’s analysis, and we will affirm.  
 As the District Court noted, all of the Feldmans’ claims (from their constitutional 
claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to their claims under state law) are predicated on 
the same basis.  Namely, they assert that Mrs. Feldman’s contributions to her 401(k) plan 
are not taxable by local authorities.  But, as the District Court explained, they are taxable.   
 In Pennsylvania, the Local Tax Enabling Act permits a political subdivision (like 
defendant Dormont Borough or defendant Keystone Oaks School District) to tax the 
earned income of its residents.  See 53 P.S. §§ 6924.301.1(a), 6924.311(3), 6924.317.  In 
light of statutory amendments in 2002 and 2004 (Act 166 of 2002 and Act 24 of 2004), 
“earned income” is equivalent to “compensation” under Pennsylvania’s Tax Reform 
Code of 1971, 53 P.S. § 6924.501.  Compensation is defined as “items of remuneration 
                                              
1 The Feldmans do not raise a challenge to the denial of leave to amend, so we consider 
the issue waived.  See Gonzalez v. AMR, 549 F.3d 219, 225 (3d Cir. 2008).   
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received, directly or through an agent, in cash or in property, based on payroll periods or 
piecework, for services rendered as an employee.”  61 Pa. Code § 101.6(a).  
Contributions to a retirement benefit plan made by an employee are not excludable from 
the definition of taxable compensation.  Id. at § 101.6(c)(8)(ii)(B); see also, e.g., 
Boguslavsky v. N. Pocono Sch. Dist., 11 A.3d 582, 587 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010) 
(rejecting a challenge to regulatory scheme); Kalodner v. Commonwealth, 615 A.2d 900, 
904 & n.1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).  Accordingly, Mrs. Feldman’s contributions to her 
401(k) plan were taxable. 
 As they argued in the District Court, the Feldmans press on appeal their claim that 
a Magisterial Judge’s 1992 decision precludes the collection of tax on Mrs. Feldman’s 
contributions or a ruling that those contributions constitute taxable income.  However, 
that claim fails for the reasons given by the District Court.2  To sum up, the ruling, in 
1992, could not serve as an interpretation of Pennsylvania law relevant to the 2012 tax 
year.  The ruling predated the statutory amendments that provide the relevant definition 
of earned income.  Despite their arguments to the contrary, the doctrines of res judicata 
and collateral estoppel do not apply.  See Comm’r v. Thomas Flexible Coupling Co., 198 
F.2d 350, 353 (3d Cir. 1952) (explaining that “tax claims for successive years do not 
involve the same cause of action” for purposes of res judicata); Comm’r v. Sunnen, 333 
                                              
2 We reject the Feldmans’ argument that the District Court did not “assume key factual 
allegations” about the opinion and otherwise.  The District Court explicitly accepted all 
inferences in favor of the Feldmans regarding the nature of the Magisterial Judge’s ruling 
in making its determination.  District Court Memorandum at 6.   
4 
 
U.S. 591, 599-600 (1948) (“[W]here two cases involve income taxes in different taxable 
years, collateral estoppel . . . must be confined to situations where the matter raised in the 
second suit is identical in all respects with that decided in the first proceeding and where 
the controlling facts and applicable legal rules remain unchanged.”).   
 For these reasons, and as the District Court explained, the Feldmans failed to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted.3  Accordingly, the District Court properly 
dismissed their complaint.  We will affirm the District Court’s judgment.      
 
                                              
3 The Feldmans ask us to separately address four of their claims for which, they assert, 
the District Court provided insufficient analysis.  One is a claim that subsections of 61 Pa 
Code § 101.6 (relating to compensation in the form of 401(k) contributions) are 
unconstitutionally vague; another is that Pennsylvania’s definition of earned income 
violates the uniformity clause of the Pennsylvania constitution; and the others are claims 
that the taxation of 401(k) contributions violates their right to equal protection under the 
law and constitutes an unlawful taking.  First, we note that the District Court addressed at 
least one of these claims in detail.  See District Court Memorandum at 6 (citing 
Pennsylvania cases rejecting the uniformity challenge).  Second, the District Court was 
not wrong to conclude that these claims, like the others, were based on an incorrect 
premise (their argument that the defendants could not collect taxes on the 401(k) 
contributions).  Third, there is no legal basis for their claims; they are without merit.    
